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Based on the methodology of Ravallion 
and Chen (2003), Kakwani and Pernia 
(2000) and Kakwani, Khandker and Son 
(2003) and using household survey data, 
we analyze poverty, inequality and pro-poor 
changes in South Africa over the period 
1995-2005 and in Mauritius over the 
period 2001-2006. Conditions are very 
different in these two countries. South 
Africa is one of the least equal countries in 
the developing world while inequality in 
Mauritius is relatively low in comparison to 
other African countries. Similarly, using a 
reference threshold of USD 3 a day, we 
find that poverty headcount was initially 
around 42% in South Africa and 6% in 
Mauritius. Moreover, in addition to these 
initial differences, the two countries have 
experienced very different pro-poor growth 
paths. Temporal differences reveal that 
inequalities have increased significantly in 
South Africa over the period and that the 
poverty headcount in 2005 would have 
been around 10 percentage points lower 
without this strong adverse redistribution 
effect. South African growth has been anti-
poor relatively speaking. Conversely, 
growth was absolutely pro-poor in 
Mauritius over the period 2001-2006. 
Deeper analysis is conducted across areas 
of residence (urban and rural) and 
according to educational achievements 
(some schooling versus no schooling) and 
gender. A comparison between Mauritius 
and South Africa allows for a better 
understanding of both growth and 
redistribution effects on poverty and for 
drawing some policy recommendations 
towards reducing poverty in these 
countries. 
 
Keywords: Pro-poor growth analysis, poverty, inequality, Mauritius, South Africa 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent years have witnessed an increasingly strong interest in the impact of economic 
growth on poverty. An important reason for this has been the establishment of the so-
called Millennium Development Goals, which have set poverty reduction as a 
fundamental objective of development. In the literature on the linkages between growth, 
poverty and inequality, there is often a tension between macro and microanalysis. 
Although a search for general conclusions may seem natural at a macro level, it is 
increasingly acknowledged that careful micro work is needed to deal adequately with 
poverty issues (Shorrocks and van der Hoeven, 2004). The objective of this paper is thus 
to conduct a micro-level analysis of inequality and poverty changes in two Southern 
African countries.  
 
Using two household survey data separated by 5 and 10-year intervals, we are able to 
conduct a pro-poor growth analysis in Mauritius over the period 2001-2006 and in South 
Africa over the period 1995-2005. The poverty line is set at a reference threshold of USD 
3 per day (to reflect Mauritius’ and South Africa’s status of middle-income countries), 
and sensitivity tests are performed to check for the robustness of results. We use the FGT 
class of poverty indices (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984) to measure poverty 
incidence and intensity, growth incidence curves (Ravallion and Chen, 2003) to show the 
growth rates of income over different parts of the population, and Gini indices and 
Lorenz curves to assess inequality. Growth-redistribution decompositions and indices of 
pro-poorness also enable to evaluate the recent effects of growth and inequality on 
poverty in Mauritius and South Africa. The analysis further discerns the development 
disparities across rural and urban areas, across districts and provinces, and across 
schooling achievements and gender of the household head. In the case of South Africa, 
we are also able to monitor the evolution of racial disparities. A major finding is that 
Mauritius and South Africa have experienced very different effects of growth on poverty 
and inequality, and this is suggestive of policy recommendations towards reducing 
poverty and inequality. 
 
Section 2 introduces the conceptual and analytical framework for assessing the pro-
poorness of growth. Section 3 presents the results of the case studies for Mauritius and 
South Africa. Section 4 concludes with some policy recommendations based on the 
paper’s findings.  
 
2.  FRAMEWORK FOR PRO-POOR GROWTH ANALYSIS 
 
Addressing whether growth is pro-poor first requires clarifying the concept of pro-
poorness, which is usually related to the idea that the poor “get more from growth than 
some predefined benchmark”. This has generated considerable debate in the scientific 
and policy community. Both a relative and an absolute approach have been proposed to 
defined growth pro-poorness. In the absolute approach, growth is defined as pro-poor if it 
reduces absolute poverty. In the relative approach, growth is pro-poor if reduces 
inequality and relative poverty, meaning that growth must benefit the poor 
proportionately more than the non-poor. Although the most frequently advocated manner   6
to achieve absolute poverty reduction is through economic growth, whether growth can 
be deemed to be “pro-poor” can thus depend on the impact of growth on inequality and 
on how much this impact on inequality feeds into poverty – see among many others 
Bourguignon (2003), Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998), Dollar and Kraay (2002), 
Eastwood and Lipton (2001), Ravallion (2001), United Nations (2000), and World Bank 
(2002).  
 
2.1  Overview of the debate on absolute or relative pro-poor growth 
 
A central question in the growth pro-poorness debate is therefore whether we should be 
interested in the impact of growth on “absolute poverty” or on “relative poverty” and 
inequality. To assess whether growth has been pro-poor, it is particularly important to 
distinguish between growth that changes the incomes of the poor either by a positive 
absolute amount (for absolute poverty) and growth that changes the incomes of the poor 
by the same proportional amount as in the rest of the population (for relative poverty 
and/or relative inequality). The first type of growth is deemed pro-poor by the view that a 
change is good for the poor if it increases the poor's absolute living standards (see for 
instance Ravallion and Chen, 2003). The second type of growth is deemed pro-poor by 
the view that “promoting pro-poor growth requires a strategy that is deliberately biased in 
favor of the poor so that the poor benefit proportionately more than the rich” (Kakwani 
and Pernia (2000), p.3).  
 
Assessing the pro-poorness of growth under an absolute versus a relative view can lead to 
very different descriptive and policy conclusions. The main reason is that the impact of 
growth on absolute poverty is often quite different from its impact on relative inequality. 
The two leading views of pro-poorness indeed attach completely opposite weights to 
whether growth should be expected to change the incomes of the poor by at least some 
absolute amount – for absolute pro-poor views – or by at least some proportional amount 
– for relative pro-poor views. The tension between advocates of the absolute and relative 
criteria for assessing the impact of growth has also been evident in the agenda of 
international organizations. Perhaps the most prominent example (Meth, 2007) of this is 
in the “Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” Millennium Development Goal. This goal 
mixes a criterion for halving absolute poverty (defined as the proportion of the population 
below either USD 1 per day or an absolute national poverty line) and a criterion for 
reducing inequality set in terms of increasing the share of the poorest quintile in total 
consumption. 
 
Given that poverty reduction has become a fundamental objective of development, it is 
important to ask whether growth is a necessary and/or sufficient condition to achieve that 
objective. The consensual answer in the scientific and policy community is “no”. Growth 
is not enough for poverty reduction since episodes of growth are sometimes associated 
with increasing absolute and/or relative poverty. Even for those episodes in which growth 
reduces poverty, “it is found that not all growth is equally good” (Thurlow and Wobst, 
2006).  
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The impact of growth on poverty is heterogeneous for two main reasons. First, it depends 
on the existing level of inequality. One way to check this in the literature has been to 
compute a “distribution-corrected rate of growth in average income”, given by initial 
equality times the rate of growth. For a given rate of growth, the distribution-corrected 
rate of growth is then larger in more equal societies than in less equal ones (see 
Ravallion, 2004a). Everything else being the same, a given level of growth also achieves 
a higher impact on poverty the greater the distribution-corrected rate of growth. Second, 
the impact of growth depends on the “type” of growth that is experienced. For instance, is 
it industry-driven growth? Is it export-driven growth? Is average growth driven by 
growth in rural/agricultural areas? This matters since growth differentiation across areas 
and sectors is bound to affect inequality, and thus poverty, in addition to the poverty 
impact that is expected to be generated by average growth. And what drives the changes 
in inequality is also bound to affect poverty.  
 
It is also advisable to focus on existing inequality because it can be an obstacle to growth. 
The link between growth, inequality and poverty is indeed particularly important from a 
dynamic perspective. The recent literature has indeed argued that too much poverty 
and/or inequality may be detrimental to the growth prospects of an economy. There might 
even exist poverty and inequality “traps”: an economy with a high level of poverty and/or 
inequality may fail to grow, or may grow very slowly (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2005 and 
World Bank, 2005). This is indeed the main message of the 2006 World Development 
Report on “Equity and Development” (World Bank, 2005). Inequality may be self-
reinforcing, hindering growth, and hampering poverty reduction in the longer term.  
 
This suggests that it may be appropriate to look at the effect of policy on absolute poverty 
and inequality even if we are normatively concerned only with long-term absolute 
poverty alleviation. Indeed, there does not seem to be a generally acceptable solution to 
the pro-poor debate other than saying that both absolute and relative pro-poorness should 
be of concern to analysts interested in the impact of growth. Because of this, we will 
consider below the impact of growth both on absolute poverty and on inequality.  
 
2.2  Methodology and data 
 
Details of the methodology are presented in the Appendix. For both Mauritius and South 
Africa, two recent household surveys are used  to assess the evolution of poverty and 
inequality and to evaluate the pro-poorness of growth (absolutely and relatively 
speaking). 
 
To compare poverty across countries and across time, we need to measure consumption 
in units that are comparable in terms of purchasing power across individuals, space and 
time. To do this, we first compute daily per capita expenditures from the micro-data 
records and value them according to 2005 price levels using the consumer price indices 
published by the statistical office of each country
i. These per capita expenditures, 
                                                 
i For some countries, rural per capita expenditures are transformed into urban values by multiplying them 
by the ratio of urban/rural poverty lines, this ratio then being used as a proxy for the price differences that   8
expressed in 2005 national-urban price levels, are then converted into 2005 US dollars 
using the 2005 purchasing power parities (PPP) that can be found in World Bank (2008). 
PPP are commonly used for comparisons of absolute levels of living standards, although 
it is well-known such comparisons can be sensitive to the choice of PPP that is made.
ii 
However, this choice does not affect the distribution of income shares within a country at 
a given time period. A poverty line of USD 3 per day is used as a reference poverty line
iii, 
but sensitivity tests are systematically performed to check for the robustness of results.  
 
Sampling weights are applied to all computations. Household sizes are also used to 
weight the household observations, so that all estimates are computed on the implicit (and 
usual) basis that individuals are the appropriate units of analysis. The computation of the 
standard errors is done taking into account (when available) the stratification and the 
clustering of the household surveys. Most of the estimation of the indices and curves is 
carried out using the DASP package - see Araar and Duclos (2007a). The household data 
on Mauritius used in this report have been collected by Mauritius' Central Statistics 
Office seventh and eighth Household Budget Surveys (2001/2002 and 2005/2006) - see 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/. The sample size is respectively of 6,710 and 6,720 
households in 2001 and 2006. The household data on South Africa have been collected 
into the Surveys on the income and expenditure of households (1995/1996 and 
2005/2006) by Statistics South Africa - see http://www.statssa.gov for more information. 
They concern 29,582 households in 1995 and 21,144 households in 2005. 
 
3.  CASE STUDIES OF MAURITIUS AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Using those datasets and the standard methodology described above and in the Appendix, 
a pro-poor growth analysis was conducted for Mauritius over 2001-2006 and for South 
Africa over 1995-2005. The following describes the initial conditions of those countries, 
including the levels of poverty and inequality. Indices of pro-poorness are thereafter 
presented along with growth-redistribution decompositions. As we shall see, the results 
from the two countries are very different. 
 
3.1  Initial conditions and policy environments in the two countries 
 
Mauritius is a small country of less than 2,000 sq km with a little more than 1 million 
inhabitants; it is also the most densely populated country in Africa. It includes the 
isolated island of Rodrigues and several smaller islands. Around half the population lives 
in urban areas. Despite its density and relatively small size, geographical and social 
diversity in living standards does exist in Mauritius. Pockets of both urban and rural 
poverty exist, the latter notably on the Rodrigues island. Disparity in incomes in urban 
areas is usually considered to be greater than in semi-urban and rural ones. Although 
various cultures and traditions live in peace in Mauritius, Mauritian Creoles, who make 
                                                                                                                                                 
prevail between the urban and the rural areas in those countries. This is not done for Mauritius and South 
Africa since no readily available information on spatial price variation could be found. 
iiSee for example Chen, Datt and Ravallion (1994) for a discussion of the use of PPP for international 
comparisons of poverty. 
iii If we set a poverty line under USD 3, the number of poor in Mauritius is quasi nil.     9
up a third of the population, live in relatively greater poverty. There is also evidence that 
the prevalence of lower incomes is mostly explained by unemployment (officially 
modest, at less than 10%) as opposed to low wages. 
 
Since its independence in 1968, Mauritius has developed from a low-income economy 
based on agriculture to a middle income economy increasingly diversified into industrial, 
financial and touristic sectors (services accounting for two-thirds of the economy). 
Mauritius' rapid economic progress over the last four decades has set it as an example of 
an African success story in terms of economic and social development. The institutional 
source of Mauritius' success has traditionally been attributed to the provision of a stable 
and competitive regulatory and fiscal (including relatively low income and corporate 
taxes) environment that favors labor-intensive activities in sectors such as sugar, textiles 
and tourism. Such policies have tended to reduce unemployment and increase labor force 
participation, in particular that of women.  
 
Mauritius' poverty reduction strategy has been to expand employment opportunities and 
modernize its economy, while maintaining an elaborate social safety net. It has been 
hoped that what remains of extreme poverty after several decades of strong economic 
growth would be alleviated by skills acquisition programs for unskilled and uneducated 
individuals and nutritional and medical assistance for the others. Mauritius has also had a 
policy of allocating significant public resources to education and health. Adult literacy 
and life expectancy are well above the sub-Saharan African average. Health care is free 
and health facilities are of reasonably good quality and accessibility throughout the 
country. The benefits of Mauritius's educational system have also become more 
universally distributed in the last 15 years, with a move away from a strongly elitist 
system to one with greater accessibility to secondary and higher education. 
 
Mauritius' economic success has largely been built as a sugar and clothing exporter as 
well an upmarket touristic destination. The government's development strategy has 
recently largely centered on attracting foreign investment. This has created a large 
number of offshore entities, many of which in direct commercial links with India and 
South Africa. Mauritian exports have, however, recently been hit by fierce competition 
from lower-cost textile producers as well as by the loss of European sugar subsidies. 
Recent public policy challenges have consequently dealt with decline of Mauritius' 
traditional textile and sugar industries, and attempts to diversify the economy towards 
sectors such as information technology, financial services, business outsourcing, and 
greater growth potential for its tourism industry. The latter is being stimulated in part by 
reducing duties on products such as clothing, food, jewelry and electronic equipment. 
 
Mauritius’ government has recently set up an ambitious package of social measures to 
mitigate the negative impacts of the recent global financial crisis. This has included large 
increases in subsidies for rice, flour and cooking gas, income support for close to 100,000 
beneficiaries, the restoration of a universal old-age pension and a 9 per cent increase in 
social assistance. Further measures have aimed at promoting inclusive growth and full 
employment. Some 9,300 small entrepreneurs (such as planters, breeders, fishermen, 
retailers and hawkers) who experienced difficulties in repaying their loans were targeted   10
to receive support. The Eradication of Absolute Poverty (EAP) program is set to assist 
7,200 families living in extreme poverty with the payment of school fees and health 
spending. EAP will also provide public housing and training to the unemployed. 
Mauritius’ program also contains provisions to address the problem of female 
unemployment, as women make up only 20 per cent of the paid workforce. The 
Empowerment Programme targets women over 45 and contributes 75 per cent of their 
wages as opposed to 50 per cent for men. In addition, a new credit scheme is being 
created to meet 100 per cent of the financing requirements of projects implemented by 
women. 
 
South Africa's successful transition from apartheid to full democracy in 1994 has given 
the world a powerful demonstration that a peaceful shift from political conflict to 
cooperation was possible. Since then, South Africa has also displayed remarkable socio-
political stability, which has resulted in a strong influence in Africa and internationally. 
South Africa also has the most advanced economy in Africa. Its geographical position 
grants it a privileged role as gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa, and its economy has grown 
rapidly since the 1994 democratic transition. South Africa's main economic sectors 
include mining (its largest industrial sector), manufacturing and services. Agriculture 
contributes around 4% to South Africa's GDP and provides mostly cattle and sheep 
farming. The country's financial infrastructure is also well developed. Real GDP growth, 
of about 4% per annum over the last 15 years, has been bolstered mostly by strong 
domestic demand in housing, services and manufacturing, and by strong private 
investment. The national government's fiscal stance has been prudent, leading to 
relatively low levels of total and external debt. Consumer price inflation has also been 
modest at about 5% since the 1994 transition. 
 
South Africa's economy has also gone through a rapid opening to the rest of the world. 
Exchange controls have been relaxed and import tariffs have been reduced. This has led 
to a greater diversity in exports, with a decrease in the relative importance of mining. It 
also has stimulated a significant increase in productivity over the last 15 years. Robust 
economic growth in the post-apartheid period has made possible a decline in absolute 
income poverty. But South Africa's relatively sophisticated formal economy still coexists 
with a large informal economy on which a substantial part of the population depends for 
a living, through near-subsistence agriculture or dependence on the informal sector.  
 
The country further suffers from the presence of large socio-economic inequalities in 
incomes and wealth, mostly resulting from the apartheid regime. These manifest 
themselves in the form of a high unemployment rate, wide areas of poverty, a significant 
prevalence of crime and insecurity, and a high degree of economic informality. These 
disparities also reflect themselves geographically. The country's climate varies 
significantly from region to region, with the Western Cape experiencing a Mediterranean 
climate and most of the interior having a semi-desert one. Most of the economic activity 
takes place around the province of Gauteng where Johannesburg and Pretoria are also 
located.  
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The country's official unemployment rate has remained very high at around 30% between 
1995 and 2005. Given the importance of labor income in total household income, the 
distribution of the incidence of unemployment across regions and different socio-
economic groups is strongly correlated with the geographic and socio-economic 
distribution of income and poverty. This is particularly important for understanding the 
differences in the incidence of poverty across racial groups. Unemployment has a 
particularly strong impact on the young, the uneducated, and those living in homelands 
and in remote areas. Rural unemployment rates are higher than urban ones, a feature that 
seems to suggest that mobility has not been as strong as in other developing countries 
where the incidence of unemployment is stronger in urban areas. As in many other 
developing countries, however, most of the unemployed are young, and this raises the 
challenge of coping with a labor force whose growth is fuelled by demographic pressures.  
 
The more deprived population in terms of income and wealth also has more limited 
access to economic opportunities and basic services. HIV/AIDS-prevalence is high in 
South Africa, with an estimated 17 percent of South Africans between the ages of 15 and 
49 living with HIV in 2009, one of the highest rates in the world. All of this poses 
important challenges for South Africa's economic and social development. Many of 
South Africa's challenges for economic and social development are further correlated 
with the legacy of South Africa's history of apartheid. The political and economic 
oppression of the blacks has indeed skewed the country's poverty profile along racial 
lines. 
 
To accelerate growth and share more evenly its benefits, government initiatives to meet 
these challenges have tended to take various forms. In 1996, the government's plan to 
alleviate poverty relied prominently on a market-based approach to foster growth and 
create jobs. Trade liberalization has in particular been at the forefront of the country's 
post-Apartheid economic strategy, reflecting a commitment to outward-stimulated 
development. Government has also tried to boost productivity, long-run employment and 
growth through privatisation, despite short-term costs. More recent official policy has 
tried to reorient government spending to fight deprivation in areas such access to 
improved health care and quality education, provision of decent work, sustainability of 
livelihoods, and development of economic and social infrastructure.  
 
Land redistribution is an ongoing issue. Most farmland is still owned by the white 
population. Land transfers have so far been mutually agreed by buyers and sellers, but 
they have been hints of possible expropriations to attain the official objective of 
transferring 30% of farmland to black South Africans by 2014. As of 2008, however, 
only between 5 and 7 per cent of land had been transferred, raising doubts on the 
achievability of the target. 
 
While significant achievements have already been made in areas such as access to basic 
water supply, improvement in service delivery remains a priority in South Africa. The 
quality of health care and education is extremely heterogeneous across provinces. 
Primary and secondary schools too often fail to provide useful employment skills, hence 
prolonging the severe skill gap inherited from Apartheid and hampering economic   12
development and the reduction of unemployment. The gap between disadvantaged 
(black) and advantaged (white) schools persists, with dramatic differences in repetition 
and drop-out rates. In addition, important provincial disparities persist in terms of the 
availability of medical staff and the quality of services. A further problem is that most 
urban black South Africans are highly concentrated in suburban townships, far from 
economic opportunities; high transport costs and crime inhibit job searching in 
townships. Development of skills is a high priority. 
 
3.2  Analysis of poverty incidence and intensity 
 
3.2.1  Reduction of poverty incidence and intensity in Mauritius 
 
Mauritius' development model seems to account to some extent for the distributive 
change that the country has experienced in the first half of the 2000s. Mauritius started 
with a relatively low level of national poverty in comparison to other African countries of 
similar average consumption levels. Its development process of moving from an economy 
based on agriculture to one increasingly oriented towards manufacturing, services and 
exports appears to provide part of the explanation for the fall in its national headcount 
rate at USD 3 from 5.8% in 2001 to 4.1% in 2006 (see Table 1). This fall is also 
statistically significant at a 95% level. 
 
Mauritius' development has also had important geographical and socio-economic impacts 
on the distribution and the incidence of poverty. The district-level headcounts were in 
2001 slightly higher (at around 10%) in urban Port Louis than in the Southern districts of 
Savanne and Plaines Wilhems (which were at around 3%). The isolated island of 
Rodrigues stood alone in exhibiting a large headcount of 30%. The estimates of the 
changes in poverty indicate, however, that it is in those districts where poverty was more 
prevalent that the poverty fall between 2001 and 2006 was also greater. The largest 
statistical change in poverty occurred in Port Louis, where the headcount estimate 
decreased from almost 10% in 2001 to less than 5% in 2006. The estimates for the island 
of Rodrigues also suggest an impressive fall in the poverty headcount from around 30.3% 
to 22.8%, an important change in only 5 years. Table 3 presents a similar decomposition 
to Table 1, but this time based on the average poverty gap index. In 2001, Rodrigues 
again exhibits a much larger degree of poverty, eight times that of the national level, and 
its relative contribution (24%) to total poverty is now also eight times that of its 
population share (3%). This suggests that the intensity of poverty in Rodrigues, relative 
to the national average, is even larger than its incidence. Nationally, the average poverty 
gap has fallen from 1.2% to 0.9%, a change that is almost statistically significant at a 5% 
level. 
 
Tables 2 and 4 decompose headcount poverty (incidence) and the average poverty gap 
(intensity) across areas of residence (urban and rural), schooling achievements (some 
schooling  vs no schooling), and gender of the household head in Mauritius. From a 
geographic perspective, in 2001, poverty is smallest among the 34% of households that 
live in urban areas, and it is largest among the 66% of households that live in rural areas. 
Because of this, both the absolute and the relative contributions of rural households to   13
total poverty are large. Around 72% of total poverty (incidence or intensity) comes from 
rural households. Between 2001 and 2006, for both urban (from 4.8% to 2.8%) and rural 
(from 6.3% to 4.9%) zones, the estimate of headcount poverty has fallen, and in both 
cases by a statistically significant amount. The average poverty gap has also fallen in the 
two areas, but more so for the urban one. A slight trend towards a greater ruralization of 
poverty is therefore apparent in the movement from 2001 to 2006.  
 
Mauritius has apparently not succeeded in providing increased opportunities for 
employment and salaries to its uneducated population. Poverty was greatest in 2001 
among individuals (about 10% of the population) living in households whose head had no 
schooling. The poverty headcount for such households has not changed between 2001 
and 2006 and has remained at around 9%. This suggests that Mauritius' development has 
been most beneficial for the skilled and educated population and has not succeeded in the 
2001-2006 period in lifting the living standards of the others. Table 2 shows that the 
poverty headcount has fallen (from 5.4% to 3.8%) statistically and numerically for those 
living in households whose head has some schooling.  
 
In 2001, the incidence of poverty is also greatest among individuals who live in female-
headed households (9.2% vs. 5.3% for male-headed households). Those households 
represent around 13% of the population of individuals. The average poverty gap among 
those living in female-headed households (2.6%) is twice as large as for those living in 
male-headed households (1.1%). Table 2 also shows that the poverty headcount has fallen 
statistically and numerically for those living in male-headed and in female-headed 
households in Mauritius. The fall in poverty incidence has been proportionally greater for 
those living in male-headed households (from 5.3% to 3.5%) than for the others (from 
9.2% to 7.9%). Table 4 suggests the same results for poverty intensity. 
 
Figure 1 show the sensitivity of the headcount to the choice of the poverty line in 2006. 
The incidence of poverty below USD 2 a day is negligible. The headcount rises rapidly at 
poverty lines higher than USD 4, which also indicates that it is at this point that 
Mauritius' density of consumption starts being important. 35% of the population lives on 
less than USD 6 a day in 2006. Figure 2 shows how the difference in headcount between 
2001 and 2006 varies with the choice of poverty lines. The differences are everywhere 
statistically significant, except for poverty lines less than around USD 2.4. The larger the 
poverty line, the greater the difference between the headcounts of the two years. In other 
words, in 2006, for larger poverty lines up to USD 6, the number of poor was 
systematically lower than it was in 2001.  
 
3.2.2  Disparities of poverty incidence and intensity in South Africa 
 
Africa's most advanced economy has grown rapidly since its 1994 democratic transition 
from apartheid, with a real GDP growth of about 4% per annum over the last 15 years. It 
has also gone through a rapid opening to the rest of the world, with increased diversity in 
exports and a decrease in the relative economic importance of traditional sectors such as 
mining. Given South Africa's relative affluence, it may seem surprising that 42 per cent 
of its citizens lived between 1995 and 2005 on less than USD 3 per day (see Table 8).   14
This was nevertheless the case since South Africa's relatively sophisticated formal 
economy has coexisted and still coexists with a large informal economy and near-
subsistence agricultural sector, on which a substantial part of the population depends for a 
living. The country also suffers from the presence of large socio-economic inequalities in 
incomes and wealth. These disparities also reflect themselves geographically in the data 
discussed above. Most of the economic activity takes place around Gauteng and Western 
Cape. The province-level poverty headcounts (at USD 3 a day) are also lowest in those 
provinces (less than 20%), and are considerably higher in all of the other (often above 
50%) provinces. An example of a consequence of this is that, because of its higher 
poverty rate, the relative contribution of the Eastern Cape (a contribution of 24%) to total 
national poverty is much larger than its share (16%) in South Africa's total population.  
 
The national poverty headcount has remained basically unchanged between 1995 and 
2005 and was still in 2005 at around 41% at USD 3. The province-level headcounts have 
been continuously lower between 1995 and 2005 in Gauteng and in the Western Cape. In 
spite of this, the middle and central provinces of Eastern Cape, Free State, and North 
West have registered during that period important falls in poverty. In no more than ten 
years, the Free State province has for instance moved from the province with the second-
highest poverty headcount to the province with the third-lowest poverty headcount 
among the nine provinces. Conversely, KwaZulu Natal has moved between 1995 and 
2005 from the province with the sixth-highest poverty headcount to the province with the 
second-highest poverty headcount among the same nine provinces. 
 
Poverty incidence is least among those living in urban areas, and is by far larger among 
those living in rural areas (see Table 10). This geographical divide is even larger for the 
intensity of poverty in both periods: the average poverty gap is more than three times as 
large in rural areas as it is in urban areas (see Table 11). The rural population share has 
fallen significantly from 52% to 41% in ten years, a change plausibly due essentially to 
migration from rural to urban areas. Rural poverty has essentially remained unchanged, 
but urban poverty has registered an important increase from 21% to 26%, again probably 
due to the urban migration of individuals that have not been able to escape poverty in the 
migration process. The relative contribution of the urban areas to national poverty has 
therefore increased importantly, from 24% to 38%. In ten years, the proportion of South 
Africa's poor living in urban areas has thus increased from less than a quarter to almost 
two-fifths. This suggests an important urbanization of South African poverty. South 
Africa's pattern of economic development has therefore significantly affected the 
urban/rural distribution of poverty.  
 
Poverty incidence is also considerably larger among individuals living in households 
whose head has no schooling than among those living in households whose head has 
some schooling. Given the importance of labor income in the total income of South 
African households, this is also indicative of a strong geographical and socio-
demographic divide in access to employment and production markets. In 2005, the 
poverty headcount is again considerably larger (70%) among individuals living in 
households whose head has no schooling than among those living in households whose 
head has some schooling (35%). Poverty by level of education (no schooling, some   15
schooling) has remained statistically unchanged, but the share in the population of those 
living in households whose head has no schooling has fallen from 23% to 19%. South 
African poverty has thus become increasingly associated with poverty among more 
educated households. Again, this supports the view that poverty alleviation policies must 
increasingly ponder issues of migration and rural/urban demographic pressure, as well as 
integration of the young and of urban migrants to labor markets. 
 
In 1995, the incidence of poverty is also considerably greater (54% vs 36%) among 
individuals who live in female-headed households compared to male-headed households. 
Compared to Mauritius (13%), the share of individuals who live in female-headed 
households is also large, at around 33%. Because of this, almost half (42%) of the poor in 
South Africa are found in female-headed households. Table 10 also shows that the 
poverty headcount has changed numerically by little in South Africa between 1995 and 
2005, for both those living in male-headed and for those living in female-headed 
households. The population share of those living in female-headed households has, 
however, increased substantially, from 33% to 43%. This now means that the majority 
(56%) of South Africa's poor in 2005 are now found in female-headed households. Table 
11 suggests the same results for poverty intensity, except for the fact that the average 
poverty gap has fallen statistically for both groups. 
 
Table 10 also decomposes South Africa's incidence of poverty across four racial groups. 
The largest incidence of poverty (52%) is found among the African/Black group, with the 
Coloured group exhibiting considerably less (almost less than half, at 27%). The 
Indian/Asian and White groups have a negligible incidence of poverty (always at USD 3 
per day). The share of African/Black individuals in the total population is also large, at 
76%. Because of this, the vast majority of South Africa's poor are found in African/Black 
households. In 2005, the incidence of poverty among individuals living in African/Black 
households has fallen statistically, with estimates down from 52% to 49%. Poverty in the 
other groups has remained statistically unchanged. The share of African/Black 
individuals in the total population has moved up from 76% to 80%. Conversely, the share 
of individuals living in White households has moved down from 13% to 9%. The share of 
South Africa's poor found in African/Black households has remained statistically 
unchanged at about 94%.  
 
Figure 7 shows the sensitivity of South Africa's headcount to the choice of the poverty 
line in 2006. South African pockets of poverty emerge at consumption levels as low as 
USD 0.5 a day. The incidence of poverty rises rapidly for poverty lines between USD 1 
and USD 3. Sixty percent of the population lives with less that USD 5 a day. Figure 8 
shows how the difference in headcount between the two years varies with the choice of 
poverty lines. The differences are not statistically significant, except for poverty lines 
between USD 0.6 and USD 2.  
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3.3  Analysis of inequality  
 
3.3.1  Slight deterioration in inequality in Mauritius 
 
With a national Gini of around 0.34, Mauritius' level of inequality is also relatively low in 
comparison to other African countries of similar levels of development, especially 
Southern African countries. Mauritius' development experience in the early 2000s has not 
altered this substantially, although there is evidence that inequality has worsened slightly 
between 2001 and 2006. Table 5 shows the national Gini index and disaggregates it 
according to districts, zones of residence, and education types. The only district-level 
Gini index that has shown a statistically significant change between the two years is that 
of the Eastern district of Flacq.  
 
Figures 3 shows the Lorenz curve for 2006 Mauritius, and Figure 4 shows the difference 
in the two Lorenz curves (2006 minus 2001). The evidence here is more informative than 
above. The Lorenz curve for Mauritius is indicative of a greater degree of equality than in 
many other developing countries, especially Southern African countries. The bottom half 
enjoys around 28% of total consumption, and the bottom 20% is responsible for around 
8% of total consumption. Figure 4 shows, however, that Mauritius' Lorenz curve 
deteriorated slightly between 2001 and 2006. The bottom half of the population lost a bit 
more than 1% of total national consumption. This estimate is statistically greater than 
zero. In fact, the confidence intervals around the differences in consumption shares lie 
above zero for a wide range of middle percentiles. For a wide range of Mauritius' Lorenz 
curves, therefore, inequality has statistically worsened between 2001 and 2006. Although 
the change in the Gini coefficient is not statistically significant, there is therefore 
evidence that the distribution of consumption has become more unequal in the first half 
of the 2000s. 
 
3.3.2  Significant increase in inequality in South Africa 
 
South Africa's national Gini of around 0.62 positions it in 1995 among the least equal 
countries in the world. Within-province inequality is strong almost everywhere across the 
country (see Table 12). No province has seen a statistically significant fall between 1995 
and 2005 in its Gini index, and four provinces have seen a significant increase in it - 
namely, those provinces whose Gini estimate was among the lowest in 1995. These are 
Western Cape (Gini estimate up from 0.55 to 0.67), KwaZulu Natal (from 0.58 to 0.66), 
Gauteng (0.54 to 0.64) and Mpumalanga (from 0.55 to 0.65). There has therefore been a 
leveling up of provincial Ginis between 1995 and 2005: those provinces that were more 
equal have become less so. This has led to an important and significant increase in 
national inequality. 
 
The urban Gini has also considerably increased from 0.55 to 0.65, but rural inequality has 
fallen from 0.58 to 0.53. This is consistent with the view that migration from rural to 
urban areas has been associated with difficulties of the urban migrants to integrate in 
labor markets and to generate adequate income. South African individuals living in 
households with some education have also become more unequal with time, suggesting   17
again that labor market participation has not been made equally accessible to the 
increasing number of educated South Africans. 
 
Figure 9 shows the Lorenz curves for 2005 South Africa, and Figure 10 shows the 
difference in the two Lorenz curves (2005 minus 1995). The evidence confirms the 
finding that South Africa displays a considerable degree of inequality. The bottom half 
enjoys little less than around 10% of total consumption; the top half enjoys around 90% 
of it. The bottom 10% has a negligible share of total consumption. The bottom half of the 
population has lost around 2% of total national consumption to the top half. The top 10% 
of the population has seen its share in total consumption rise by 8% in only 10 years. 
Inequality has statistically worsened between 1995 and 2005, consistent with the strong 
increase in the Gini index mentioned above. 
 
3.4  Growth redistribution decomposition 
 
3.4.1  Strong effect of Growth on Poverty in Mauritius 
 
Table 6 decomposes the change in Mauritius' headcount poverty between 2001 and 2006 
in terms of the effect of growth and of changes in inequality. The headcount movement 
can be explained in large part by a growth effect. 1.9 percentage point of the 1.7 
percentage point fall from 5.8% to 4.1% can indeed be attributed to a growth effect - the 
per capita real income growth rate over the entire 2001-2006 period was about 11.2%. 
The bottom half of Mauritius' population lost around 1% of total national consumption to 
the top half. This slight worsening of inequality was not, however, substantially 
detrimental to the effect of growth on poverty reduction. The fall in poverty between 
2001 and 2006 would have been from 5.8% to 3.9% if inequality had remained 
unchanged, instead of the observed fall from 5.8% to 4.1%. Hence, Mauritius's 
development in the early 2000s did roughly succeed in reducing poverty through growth 
and at a relatively modest poverty cost through an increase in inequality. For each of the 
urban and the rural zones, it is growth that explains numerically and statistically almost 
all of the fall in the incidence of poverty. Redistribution has contributed very little to the 
poverty change. 
 
3.4.2  Cancellation of both effects on poverty in South Africa 
 
The total change in poverty between 1995 and 2005 is neither numerically nor 
statistically significant. The effects of growth and redistribution on poverty have, 
however, been important (see Table 13). Growth reduced poverty by around nine 
percentage points. The increase in inequality increased poverty by roughly the same 
numerical value. Hence, both the growth and the redistribution effects have been 
important, but they have almost exactly cancelled each other. The headcount in 2005 
would have been roughly 10 percentage points lower (from 42% to 33%) had it not been 
of the increase in inequality between 1995 and 2005. Hence, poverty has changed little in 
South Africa between 1995 and 2005, but it is not to say that little else has changed: 
average consumption has increased substantially, but inequality has also risen 
importantly, and this has cancelled all of the positive poverty effects of growth. Urban   18
poverty has increased significantly between the two years, due to a strong adverse 
redistribution effect. The effect is due to a substantial increase in inequality. The picture 
is reversed for rural poverty, which has not changed statistically between the two time 
periods. Rural growth in average consumption has been negative, and this has increased 
rural poverty by about 7 percentage points. The fall in rural inequality has fortunately 
brought down the incidence of poverty by an estimated level of five percentage points. 
The incidence of rural poverty has tended to remain roughly unchanged between 1995 
and 2005. 
 
3.5  Indices of pro-poorness 
 
3.5.1  Absolute Pro-poorness in Mauritius 
 
Table 7 provides estimates and confidence intervals for Mauritius' 2001-2006 growth rate 
(denoted by the variable  g ) and for five different pro-poor indices. The Ravallion and 
Chen (2003) index, the Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2003) (or PEGR , or “poverty-
equivalent growth rate”) index, and the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) index can be used as 
indices of absolute pro-poorness. They indicate whether the incomes of the poor have 
grown sufficiently in that period for absolute poverty indices to have fallen. Three of the 
indices can also be used as indices of relative pro-poorness. They help assess whether the 
incomes of the poor have grown sufficiently during a time period to follow the overall 
increase ( g ) in incomes. The first two indices are conveniently given by the Ravallion 
and Chen (2003) index minus  g  and by the Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2003) index 
minus  g . The last index of relative pro-poorness is given by the difference between 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000)'s index and 1.  
 
All of the three indices of absolute pro-poorness are statistically greater than zero; this 
means that the change from 2001 to 2006 has decreased absolute poverty. Conversely, 
the estimates of Ravallion and Chen (2003) index minus  g  and of Kakwani, Khandker 
and Son (2003) index minus  g  are all negative but not statistically different from zero. 
The same is true of the difference between Kakwani and Pernia (2000)'s index and 1. 
From a relative perspective, therefore, the significant growth in Mauritius' living 
standards between 2001 and 2006 has not been sufficiently pro-poor for that to be 
empirically validated. 
 
It is important to assess whether and how the pro-poor evidence provided by the indices 
discussed above is supported by a closer look at the distributive impact of growth 
between 2001 and 2006. This can be done by looking at the absolute and the relative 
impact of growth across the entire distribution (Figures 5 and 6). Figure 5 shows the 
absolute change in consumption is everywhere statistically positive, indicating that 
growth has been absolutely pro-poor regardless of where we look in the distribution. 
However, the proportional changes relative to the growth rate in mean consumption do 
not vary much across percentiles. The growth rates being roughly proportional across 
percentiles is also consistent with the evidence discussed above that inequality in 
Mauritius has not changed radically between 2001 and 2006.   19
 
3.5.2  Relative Anti-Poorness in South Africa 
 
For South Africa, only one of the three indices of absolute pro-poorness is statistically 
greater than zero (see Table 14). Thus, there is little evidence that growth has been 
absolutely pro-poor in South Africa between 1995 and 2005. It implies that the growth 
rates of the poor's incomes have not been high enough to follow the growth rate in 
average income. From a relative perspective, therefore, the significant growth in South 
Africa's average living standards between 1995 and 2005 has been relatively anti-poor, 
since it has decreased significantly the poor's relative shares in total consumption. Figure 
11 shows the absolute change in consumption is mostly flat and visually rarely 
statistically different from zero, except for the very top percentiles, where it has been 
significant both numerically and statistically. Consumption at the 90th percentile has, for 
instance, increased by about USD6 a day between 1995 and 2005. Consumption of 
individuals between the bottom and the 80th percentiles has basically remained 
unchanged during the same period. Whether growth has been absolutely pro-poor 
therefore depends on where in the distribution we look at. If we use the poverty 
headcount as a measure of absolute poverty, then the evidence of Figure 12 suggests that 
the answer is statistically inconclusive. If, however, we focus more on the growth 
experience of the poorest - as the Ravallion and Chen (2003) index does - then, we can 
conclude that growth has been (marginally) absolutely pro-poor. As reported in Table 14, 
the growth rate in average consumption is around 25%. That is clearly above the growth 
rates experienced by most South Africans in Figure 12. 
 
South Africa's promotion of market-based growth and job creation and its emphasis on 
privatization and trade liberalization has therefore had mixed results. Growth has not 
been absolutely pro-poor between 1995 and 2005, and it has been anti-poor relatively 
speaking, essentially increasing consumption levels and consumption shares only among 
the top 10% to 30% of the population. Strong domestic demand in housing, services and 
manufacturing and strong private investments have apparently not managed to integrate 
sufficiently the poorer South Africans, and the urban migrants in particular, into 
productive markets capable of raising their living standards above poverty, and capable 
also of fostering a more inclusive society. 
 
4.  POLICY CONCLUSIONS  
 
Our results are suggestive of several ways through which growth can lead to poverty 
alleviation and greater inclusiveness. They also provide some guidance as to the type of 
policies that can increase the pro-poorness of growth.  
 
The two countries have moved progressively over the last decades – through policies and 
structural change – from economies based largely on agriculture and primary sectors of 
activity to economies increasingly based on manufacturing, services, exports and tourism. 
As described in paragraph 3.1, in both Mauritius and South Africa, privatization and trade 
liberalization were promoted as policies to spur growth. However, policy choices in the   20
two countries have been different in terms of employment opportunities and human 
capital development.  
 
While Mauritius has focused its poverty reduction strategy on education and health 
services and has targeted the most vulnerable segment of the population through 
improved social safety nets, South Africa’s policy focus has shifted to fighting 
deprivation more recently. It has not succeeded yet in developing skills and providing 
quality health care and education services across the entire country.  
 
The results in terms of growth pro-poorness have been quite different. South Africa's 
promotion of market-based growth and job creation has had mixed results: it has not been 
absolutely pro-poor between 1995 and 2005, and it has been anti-poor relatively 
speaking, improving living standards only among the top third of the population. The 
increase in domestic demand for housing and services and the rise in manufacturing and 
private investments have not integrated sufficiently the poorer South Africans (and the 
urban migrants in particular) into productive labor markets. Because of this, South 
Africa’s pattern of economic development between 1995 and 2005 appears to have failed 
to generate a pattern of inclusive development. South Africa’s growth benefitted almost 
exclusively the higher earners in urban areas. Rural workers gained very little from it, and 
the unskilled and lower urban earners often lost from it.  
 
In the two countries, there are important development disparities across rural and urban 
areas. Poverty is initially larger in rural than in urban areas; it is substantially more so in 
South Africa. South Africa's recent pattern of economic development has also affected 
the urban/rural balance. The rural population share has fallen significantly from 52% to 
41% in ten years, a change that can be attributed essentially to migration from rural to 
urban areas. Though rural poverty has remained unchanged, the incidence of urban 
poverty has registered an important increase from 21% to 26%. The proportion of South 
Africa's poor living in urban areas has risen from less than a quarter to almost two-fifths. 
Again, this is indicative of an important trend towards an urbanization of poverty in 
South Africa. South Africa’s urban Gini has also increased importantly from 0.55 to 0.65, 
although rural inequality has fallen from 0.58 to 0.53. This supports the view that 
migration from rural to urban areas has been associated with difficulties of the urban 
migrants to take full part in urban labor markets and benefit from the urban growth that is 
evident in the data.  
 
Hence, although poverty is still by and large more rural than urban, the evidence found in 
the report suggests that policy should increasingly be tilted by the fact that poverty is 
becoming more urban. That will mean inter alia that policy will want to alleviate the 
effect of migration and rural/urban demographic pressure on urban poverty. There are 
several ways in which this can be done. One of them is through better social integration 
of rural migrants into their new urban setting. Another one is through better-functioning 
and more open labor markets. Another one is through the provision of training and 
educational services that would enable rural migrants to participate better in labor 
markets and partake in the fruits of urban growth, as opposed to being left out and 
increasing urban inequality.   21
 
A critical insight that emerges is the role of labor markets in transforming growth into 
poverty alleviation and in spreading its impact in an inclusive manner. Mauritius' 
development in the early 2000’s has led to improved employment opportunities and labor 
market conditions for its relatively large skilled and educated population work force; it 
has apparently not, however, succeeded in providing such increased opportunities to its 
unskilled population. Poverty was greater in 2001 among uneducated households; despite 
absolute growth pro-poorness at the national level, poverty had remained unchanged 
between 2001 and 2006 among uneducated households.  
 
Mauritius’ pattern of export-based development oriented towards manufacturing, services 
and exports may not therefore have benefitted much the lower-skilled individuals. For 
development to benefit also the educated poor, pursuing a policy that addresses the issue 
of social and economic exclusion of urban and skilled unemployed – especially among 
the young – is of great importance. Barriers to labor mobility as well as barriers that 
prevent individuals to take advantage of economic opportunities must be removed. This 
would make it easier for the young and the newly educated to acquire experience and find 
employment. It would also make growth more inclusive. In short, removing labor market 
imperfections and barriers to employment would enhance equality of labor market 
opportunities and access to good wages.  
 
In South Africa, informal employment mainly entails subsistence-level activities 
accomplished by rural-to-urban migrants who have been unable to enter into the modern 
urban labor markets. This phenomenon provides short-term support to poor households. 
However, in the longer term, such segmentation of the labor market can seriously 
challenge South Africa’s economic development and poverty reduction strategy. Policies 
to better integrate and link informal with formal labor by encouraging informal firms to 
register and formalize their activities would not only reduce informal employment, but 
they could also boost long-term economic development.  
 
The poverty headcount is almost always considerably larger among the uneducated than 
among the educated population. In Mauritius and South Africa, the educated population 
has also been able to benefit relatively more from growth. It thus strikes as immediately 
obvious that the design of growth strategies should incorporate policies to foster 
education and training. That will not only help achieve growth, but also make that growth 
more absolutely pro-poor as well as more inclusive.  
 
With regards to women, incidence of poverty is greatest among individuals who live in 
female-headed households in Mauritius and in South Africa. In these countries, policies 
to foster the participation of women in education and in the labor force can make a 
significant difference in the distribution of family income and welfare. Empowering 
women can be one of the most effective drivers of development. 
 
Mauritius's development in the early 2000s succeeded in reducing poverty through 
growth, and at roughly no cost in terms of inequality. The growth experience of Mauritius 
thus suggests that growth can be absolutely pro-poor without being relatively anti-poor.   22
One of most striking results is the fact that the country with the strongest experience of 
positive growth has achieved the least fall in poverty. South Africa's inequality, already 
in 1995 one of the highest in the world, was increased considerably by growth. The 
bottom half of the population, who enjoyed in 1995 around 10% of total consumption, 
lost 2% of it to the top half. Inequality-neutral growth would have reduced poverty by 
9%; instead, growth was accompanied by an increase in inequality that increased poverty 
by roughly 9%. The pro-poorness of growth can therefore be quite heterogeneous across 
countries. If poverty reduction is the overriding objective, then policies designed to spur 
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1. Poverty indices 
 
Let a distribution of n incomes be given by  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n y y y , where  i y  is the income of 
individual i. Average income for that distribution is denoted by  i μ  and the poverty line 
be given by z . The most popular index of poverty is called the poverty headcount ratio. 
It gives the proportion of the population that is below  z . The next most popular poverty 
index is the average poverty gap. To understand this, it is useful to consider a measure of 
the extent to which the incomes of the poor fall below the poverty line. Denote this by 
z y z z g i i )/ ( = ) ( −  for those whose income  i y  is below  z , and by  0 = ) (z gi  for those 
whose income  i y  is equal to or greater than  z . Thus,  ) (z gi  indicates by which amount 
(as a proportion of the poverty line) the income i of individual would need to be raised to 
reach the poverty line. The average poverty gap is then the average gap in the population. 
It can be expressed as:  









g ∑ μ  (1) 
These two indices of poverty are members of a well-known class of measures called the 
FGT class of poverty indices (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984). The FGT indices are 
also averages of poverty indicators across individuals. The indicators are the same 
individual poverty gaps as before, but they are transformed by putting them to a power α
. Denote the FGT indices by  ) ; ( z P α , where the α  and the z  are two parameters that 
must be specified for the index to be calculated. These indices can then be computed as:  
  . ) (
1
= ) ; (
1 =
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When  0 = α , 
α ) (z gi  equals 0 for all those not in poverty, and 1 for all those with a 
positive poverty gap. Hence,  ) 0; = ( z P α  gives the poverty headcount. For  1 = α , 
α ) (z gi  
equals the usual poverty gap, and  ) 0; = ( z P α  is therefore the average poverty gap 
(normalized by the poverty line). The interpretation of  ) ; ( z P α  becomes slightly more 
difficult for other values of α  (see Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984). The FGT indices 
are sums of individual measures of poverty. This makes them “additive” across 
individuals and across groups of individuals. Additive poverty indices have the 
facilitating property that they can be readily decomposable into sums of subgroup 
contributions to total poverty. 
 
2. Growth curves and Cumulative income curves 
 
To define Ravallion and Chen (2003)'s “growth incidence curves”, it is first useful to 
define what a “quantile” is. Assume for simplicity that we have arranged the n incomes   26
of our population from the lowest to the highest. A quantile of a distribution is given by 
the income that is found at a particular rank in that distribution. The rank of an income  i y  
is given by  n i/ . We can then compare quantile curves before and after a change in a 
distribution has taken place. This can therefore allow us to understand the “incidence” of 
growth in our population. Let the pre-change distribution be given by 
A y  and the post-
change distribution be given by 
B y , each of equal size n (for simplicity). We can build 
quantile curves for each of these distributions; these are given by the incomes 
A
i y  and 
B
i y  
found at different ranks  n i/ . We can then assess the incidence of growth at any particular 













. Ravallion and Chen 
(2003)'s growth incidence curve is obtained by plotting this proportional change against 
all possible values of ranks  n i/ . This curve thus shows the growth rates of income at 
different points (or ranks) in the population. 
Absolute pro-poorness of growth is obtained when the dollar-value change is everywhere 
positive over the range of ranks over which the initially poor individuals are located. 
Relative pro-poorness of growth is obtained when the growth incidence curve is 
everywhere above the proportional change in mean income.  
 
One can also wish to aggregate the incomes of those in the lowest ranks of the 
population. This gives rise to two well-known curves, the Lorenz and the Generalized 
Lorenz curves. The Generalized Lorenz curve, denoted by  ) / ( n j GL gives the cumulative 
incomes of those with rank  n j/  or lower, divided by total population size. It can therefore 











n j GL ∑  (3) 
Said differently, it gives the average income of an economy in which only the incomes of 
the poorest proportion  n j/  are counted. The Lorenz curve  ) / ( n j L  is obtained by 
normalizing the Generalized Lorenz curve by mean income:  
  .
) / (
= ) / (
μ
n j L
n j L  (4) 
It gives the share in total income of the poorest proportion  n j/  of the population. A shift 
upward of the Lorenz curve leads to an unambiguous fall in inequality. 
 
3. Indices of pro-poorness 
 
Drawing growth incidence curves provides a picture of the distributional change across 
the entire range of percentiles in a population. However, it is also useful to “quantify” 
into a single measure the degree of pro-poorness of a distributive change. One such 
measure suggested by the growth incidence curves would be some sort of average income 
growth rate among the lower percentiles. This averaging can be done in several manners 
but Ravallion and Chen (2003) advocates that it should done by computing the average   27
growth rates of the incomes of the poor. Hence, we can use the average height of the 
growth incidence curve to obtain the average growth rate of the incomes of the poor. If 
the index is positive, the change is deemed to be absolutely pro-poor. Taking the 
difference between this measure and the growth in the population's average income 
provides a relative index of pro-poorness; if that relative index is positive, the distributive 
change is considered to be relatively pro-poor. 
 
We can build indices of pro-poorness by comparing differences in poverty indices before 
and after a distributive change has taken place. This can be done with any poverty index, 
including the popular headcount and average poverty gap indices. To test for the 
robustness of these changes to the selection of a poverty line z , we can graph these 
differences across different possible values of  z . This can also help assess at which 
positions in the income distribution growth has had the greatest impact on the incidence 
and on the intensity of poverty. An alternative procedure is to compare the actual poverty 
outcome of a distributive change to the outcome that would have been observed if the 
change had been distribution-neutral (see Kakwani and Pernia, 2000). There are two main 
distribution-neutrality criteria in that regard. They respectively say that a change has been 
distributionally neutral if everyone's income has changed by the same absolute amount or 
by the same proportional amount. There exist several views on what that proportion 
should be, but the most common one is the proportional change in average income.  
 
Let 
A P  and 















 is the ratio of the actual change in poverty to the change that would have been observed 
under distribution neutrality. Several poverty indices can be chosen for P . In the main 
text, P  is specified as the headcount ratio. Several scenarios of distribution neutrality can 
also serve to specify  B
~ . Let for instance  ) ,..., , ( = 2 1
A
n
A A y y y A  and  ) ,..., , ( = 2 1
B
n
B B y y y B . 























It says that a change is distribution neutral if incomes change in proportion to the 
proportional change in average income. This index thus gives the ratio of the observed 
change in poverty to the change that would have been observed under constant inequality. 
If the growth rate in average income  g  is positive and the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) 
index exceeds 0, then the distributional movement has decreased absolute poverty. If  g  
is negative and the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) index is also negative, then the 
distributive movement has again decreased absolute poverty. In these two cases, the 
change can therefore be interpreted as being absolutely pro-poor. When  g  is positive and 
the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) is negative, or when  g  is negative and the Kakwani and   28
Pernia (2000) index is positive, then the distributive change has increased absolute 
poverty, and it has therefore been absolutely anti-poor. Kakwani and Pernia (2000)'s 
index can also be used as an index of relative pro-poorness. If the growth  g  in average 
income has been positive, then the change in poverty 
B A P P −  has been relatively pro-
poor if it has led to a fall in absolute poverty that is at least as large as the change that 
would have occurred if income shares had not changed. This is the case if Kakwani and 
Pernia (2000)'s index is larger than 1: 
 
  . >
~
B A B A P P P P − −  (7) 
Conversely, if the growth in average income has been negative, then  0 <
~
B A P P − . In 
such a case, we can say that the movement from  A  to  B  has been relatively pro-poor if 
it has led to an increase in absolute poverty (
A B P P − ) that is lower than the change (
A B P P −
~
) that would have occurred with no change in income shares.  
 
Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2003) propose to assess the pro-poorness of growth by 
computing “poverty equivalent growth rates” instead of relying only on the usual rates of 
growth in average income. A poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR ) is the growth rate 
that would have resulted in the same observed level of poverty change if the distribution 
of income shares had not changed. One way to think of a PEGR  is to think of the 
counterfactual distribution of income 





A A y PEGR y PEGR y PEGR B + + +  as giving the same final level of 
poverty as the one that is actually observed. When the growth rate PEGR  is applied to 
all of initial income 
A y , poverty thus equals poverty with the distribution of 
B y . We 
therefore have 
 
  . = ~
B B P P  (8) 
and thus that  
  . = ~
B A B A P P P P − −  (9) 
 
If  PEGR  is greater than 0, the distributive change is judged to be absolutely pro-poor by 






= .  g  is thus the actual rate of growth in average income. If income shares 




i y g y ) (1 = +  
for all i. Since 
B B P P ~ = , with constant income shares, it must be that  g PEGR = . The 
poverty equivalent growth rate is therefore just the usual growth rate if inequality has 
remained unchanged. Movements in inequality will, however, create a divergence 
between the poverty equivalent growth rate and the usual growth rate. The greater the 
adverse effects of inequality on the poor, the greater the value of  B P , and therefore the 
lower the value of PEGR . Using the difference  g PEGR −  can therefore help assess 
whether the distributive change has affected the income shares of the poor. If  g PEGR −  
is negative, poverty equivalent growth is lower than growth in average income, growth   29
among the poor is lower than average growth, and the income shares of the poor have 
therefore been adversely affected by the change. The converse is true when  g PEGR −  is 
positive.  
 
4. Growth-redistribution decompositions 
 
Counterfactual inequality-neutral scenarios can also be used to decompose the change in 
poverty into “growth” and “redistribution” components. Consider an hypothetical 

















 in which all final incomes have grown from initial 
incomes by the same proportion,  A B g μ μ / = 1+ . Income shares and inequality in  A  and 
B
~  are thus the same, but average income in  B
~  is set to average income in  B . Consider 

















 in which 
counterfactual initial incomes  A
~  are obtained from final incomes  B  through an 
inequality-neutral movement from B  and average income in  A
~  equals average income 
in  A .  
 
Let us first think of moving from  A  to B  through a decomposition path that takes us 
from  A  to  B
~ , and from  B
~  to B . The change in poverty is then decomposed as 
 
  . = ~ ~




B A B A P P P P P P − + − −  (10) 
 
An alternative decomposition path is also possible; we can indeed think of a movement 
first from  A  to  A
~ , and then from  A
~  to B . The decomposition of the poverty change is 
then 
 
  . = ~ ~




A A B A P P P P P P − + − −  (11) 
 
The choice of decomposition path to follow is essentially arbitrary, and we may therefore 
just as well take the average of the two decompositions: 
 
  . ) 0.5( ) 0.5( = ~ ~ ~ ~
4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 4 42 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 4 42 1
effect tion redistribu average
A A B B
effect growth average
B A B A B A P P P P P P P P P P − + − + − + − −  (12) 
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Table 1: Decomposition of total poverty (headcount) in Mauritius, with a poverty 
line of USD 3 





















Port Louis   0.0976    0.1088    0.0106    0.1827    0.0477   0.1069   0.0051    0.1242  
  0.0135     0.0111     0.0018     0.0289    0.0120    0.0110    0.0014     0.0318  
Pamplemous
ses  
 0.0457    0.1087    0.0050    0.0855    0.0395   0.1085   0.0043    0.1045  
  0.0095     0.0112     0.0012     0.0195    0.0110    0.0112    0.0013     0.0295  
Riv du 
Rempart  
 0.0515    0.0856    0.0044    0.0758    0.0217   0.0859   0.0019    0.0455  
  0.0137     0.0100     0.0013     0.0214    0.0074    0.0101    0.0007     0.0163  
Flacq    0.0651    0.1065    0.0069    0.1193    0.0507   0.1072   0.0054    0.1325  
  0.0134     0.0111     0.0016     0.0261    0.0103    0.0110    0.0012     0.0288  
Grand Port    0.0557    0.0913    0.0051    0.0876    0.0440   0.0887   0.0039    0.0952  
  0.0140     0.0102     0.0014     0.0233    0.0126    0.0101    0.0012     0.0281  
Savanne    0.0228    0.0581    0.0013    0.0228    0.0462   0.0542   0.0025    0.0611  
  0.0097     0.0082     0.0006     0.0103    0.0134    0.0080    0.0008     0.0197  
Plaines 
Wilhems  
 0.0286    0.2845    0.0081    0.1399    0.0184   0.2982   0.0055    0.1335  
  0.0057     0.0158     0.0017     0.0270    0.0047    0.0160    0.0014     0.0327  
Moka    0.0533    0.0662    0.0035    0.0607    0.0488   0.0643   0.0031    0.0766  
  0.0127     0.0088     0.0010     0.0165    0.0184    0.0088    0.0013     0.0295  
Black River    0.0617    0.0591    0.0036    0.0627    0.0384   0.0542   0.0021    0.0507  
  0.0194     0.0083     0.0013     0.0209    0.0137    0.0080    0.0008     0.0194  
Rodrigues    0.3034    0.0312    0.0095    0.1631    0.2278   0.0317   0.0072    0.1762  
  0.0283     0.0043     0.0016     0.0260    0.0220    0.0041    0.0012     0.0281  
 Population   0.0581   1.0000   0.0581   1.0000    0.0410   1.0000   0.0410    1.0000  
0.0040   0.0000   0.0040    0.0000    0.0034    0.0000    0.0034     0.0000  
 
Table 2: Decomposition of total poverty (headcount) in Mauritius, with a poverty 
line of USD 3 
 























0.0543  0.9140  0.0496  0.8536   0.0383    0.9352    0.0358    0.8731  
0.0040   0.0043  0.0036  0.0211    0.0034    0.0037    0.0032     0.0280  
No 
schooling  
0.0990   0.0860   0.0085   0.1464    0.0804    0.0648    0.0052    0.1269  
0.0150   0.0043   0.0014    0.0211     0.0179    0.0037    0.0012     0.0280  
Urban    0.0482    0.3383    0.0163    0.2806    0.0278    0.3606    0.0100    0.2442  
  0.0059     0.0166     0.0021     0.0331     0.0051    0.0169    0.0019     0.0405  
Rural    0.0632    0.6617    0.0418    0.7194    0.0485    0.6394    0.0310    0.7558  
  0.0052     0.0166     0.0036     0.0331     0.0045    0.0169    0.0030     0.0405  
Male-
headed  
 0.0532    0.8731    0.0464    0.7987    0.0350    0.8632    0.0302    0.7356  
  0.0040     0.0044     0.0035     0.0244     0.0033    0.0044    0.0029     0.0320  
Female-
headed  
 0.0922    0.1269    0.0117    0.2013    0.0793    0.1368    0.0108    0.2644  
  0.0121     0.0044     0.0016     0.0244     0.0111    0.0044    0.0016     0.0320  
Populatio
n 
0.0581   1.0000   0.0581   1.0000    0.0410    1.0000    0.0410    1.0000  
0.0040   0.0000   0.0040    0.0000     0.0034    0.0000    0.0034     0.0000  
 
 [-] Standard errors are in italics.    34
Table 3: Decomposition of total poverty (average poverty gap) in Mauritius, with a 
poverty line of USD 3 
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Port Louis    0.0222    0.1088    0.0024    0.1960    0.0102   0.1069    0.0011    0.1203  
0.0040     0.0111     0.0005     0.0368   0.0037    0.0110     0.0004     0.0422  
Pamplemouss
es  
 0.0092    0.1087    0.0010    0.0811    0.0067   0.1085    0.0007    0.0799  
0.0025     0.0112     0.0003     0.0230   0.0024    0.0112     0.0003     0.0285  
Riv du 
Rempart  
 0.0086    0.0856    0.0007    0.0600    0.0053   0.0859    0.0005    0.0501  
0.0029     0.0100     0.0003     0.0208    0.0024    0.0101     0.0002     0.0235  
Flacq    0.0095    0.1065    0.0010    0.0822    0.0091   0.1072    0.0010    0.1081  
0.0026     0.0111     0.0003     0.0236   0.0029    0.0110     0.0003     0.0343  
Grand Port    0.0093    0.0913    0.0009    0.0694    0.0081   0.0887    0.0007    0.0792  
0.0026     0.0102     0.0003     0.0204   0.0030    0.0101     0.0003     0.0296  
Savanne    0.0036    0.0581    0.0002    0.0169    0.0121   0.0542    0.0007    0.0721  
0.0018     0.0082     0.0001     0.0090   0.0045    0.0080     0.0003     0.0282  
Plaines 
Wilhems  
 0.0060    0.2845    0.0017    0.1395    0.0034   0.2982    0.0010    0.1108  
0.0016     0.0158     0.0005     0.0342   0.0010    0.0160     0.0003     0.0328  
Moka    0.0081    0.0662    0.0005    0.0437    0.0123   0.0643    0.0008    0.0871  
0.0028     0.0088     0.0002     0.0161   0.0051    0.0088     0.0003     0.0363  
Black River    0.0144    0.0591    0.0009    0.0693    0.0102   0.0542    0.0006    0.0609  
0.0068     0.0083     0.0004     0.0324   0.0038    0.0080     0.0002     0.0241  
Rodrigues    0.0952    0.0312    0.0030    0.2420    0.0661   0.0317    0.0021    0.2315  
0.0127     0.0043     0.0006     0.0408   0.0084    0.0041     0.0004     0.0401  
 Population    0.0123    1.0000    0.0123    1.0000    0.0091   1.0000    0.0091    1.0000  
0.0011     0.0000     0.0011     0.0000   0.0009    0.0000     0.0009     0.0000  
 
Table 4: Decomposition of total poverty (average poverty gap) in 2001 Mauritius, 
with a poverty line of USD 3 



























0.0110    0.9140    0.0100    0.8170   0.0081    0.9352    0.0076    0.8385  
0.0010     0.0043     0.0009     0.0283     0.0009    0.0037     0.0008     0.0439  
No 
schooling  
0.0262    0.0860    0.0023    0.1830    0.0226   0.0648    0.0015    0.1615  
0.0048     0.0043     0.0004     0.0283     0.0067    0.0037     0.0004     0.0439  
Urban   0.0100    0.3383    0.0034    0.2764    0.0057   0.3606    0.0021    0.2263  
0.0016     0.0166     0.0006     0.0402     0.0014    0.0169     0.0005     0.0490  
Rural   0.0134    0.6617    0.0089    0.7236    0.0110   0.6394    0.0070    0.7737  
0.0014     0.0166     0.0010     0.0402     0.0012    0.0169     0.0008     0.0490  
Male-
headed  
0.0108    0.8731    0.0094    0.7669    0.0074   0.8632    0.0064    0.7066  
0.0010     0.0044     0.0009     0.0334     0.0009    0.0044     0.0008     0.0432  
Female-
headed  
0.0226    0.1269    0.0029    0.2331    0.0194   0.1368    0.0027    0.2934  
0.0038     0.0044     0.0005     0.0334     0.0033    0.0044     0.0005     0.0432  
Populatio
n 
0.0123    1.0000    0.0123    1.0000    0.0091   1.0000    0.0091    1.0000  
0.0011     0.0000     0.0011     0.0000     0.0009    0.0000     0.0009     0.0000  
 
 [-] Standard errors are in italics.     35
Table 5 : Gini indices for Mauritius 
 2001  2006 
   Group   Estimate     STD  LB  UB  Estimate  STD   LB    UB 
  Population   0.339703    0.00617  0.327591 0.351814 0.356397 0.006203    0.344223    0.368572 
1: Port Louis   0.325916   0.010409  0.305485  0.346347  0.315794  0.010829   0.294538    0.33705  
2:Pamplemousses   0.328425   0.013699  0.301536  0.355314  0.326229  0.013223   0.300275   0.352183 
3: Riv du Rempart    0.31015   0.017838  0.275139  0.345162   0.28881   0.011626   0.265991   0.311629 
4: Flacq   0.286225   0.011676  0.263307  0.309143   0.32228   0.009297   0.304031   0.340529 
5: Grand Port   0.305231   0.018363  0.269188  0.341275   0.36965   0.032629   0.305607   0.433693 
6: Savanne    0.26965   0.012923  0.244285  0.295014   0.33233   0.021903   0.289338   0.375322 
7: Plaines Wilhems   0.352421   0.009338  0.334093  0.370749  0.373008  0.010683    0.35204   0.393976 
8: Moka   0.329795   0.043512  0.244389  0.4152   0.339027  0.015233   0.309129   0.368926 
9: Black River   0.397952   0.034467  0.3303   0.465605  0.384276  0.032883   0.319733   0.448818 
10: Rodrigues   0.360913   0.014904  0.331659  0.390168  0.362576  0.010937   0.34111   0.384042 
Urban   0.35467   0.008096  0.338778  0.370562  0.373941  0.009824   0.354659   0.393222 
Rural   0.327252   0.008508  0.310553  0.343951  0.337033  0.007452   0.322406   0.351659 
Some schooling   0.341148   0.006462  0.328464  0.353832  0.356892  0.00643   0.344271   0.369513 
No schooling   0.293797   0.009396  0.275354  0.31224   0.324208  0.012363   0.299943   0.348474 
 
Table 6: Growth-redistribution decomposition of 2001-2006 headcount change in 
Mauritius 
   Estimate    STD    LB    UB  
Growth-redistribution decomposition of headcount for total population 
2001    0.058136    0.003975    0.051591    0.064682  
2006    0.04103    0.003425    0.03539    0.046671  
Growth    -0.019202    0.00325    -0.02557    -0.012833  
Redistribution    0.002096    0.005366    -0.00842    0.012613  
Growth-redistribution decomposition of headcount for Zone Urban 
 2001    0.048211    0.005882    0.038525    0.057898  
2006    0.027794    0.005114    0.019374    0.036214  
Growth    -0.020072    0.00503    -0.02993    -0.010213  
Redistribution    -0.000345    0.008203    -0.01642    0.015732  
Growth-redistribution decomposition of headcount for Zone Rural 
 2001    0.063212    0.005195    0.054657    0.071766  
2006    0.048494    0.004499    0.041085    0.055903  
Growth    -0.015292    0.004031    -0.02319    -0.00739  
Redistribution    0.000574    0.006906    -0.01296    0.01411  
 
Table 7: Pro-poor indices in Mauritius, 2001-2006 
   Pro-poor indices    Estimate    STD    LB    UB  
Growth rate (g )    0.111909    0.024382   0.064121    0.159696  
Ravallion and Chen (2003) index   0.073766    0.030274   0.014430    0.133103  
Ravallion and Chen (2003)  g −    -0.038142   0.034039   -0.104857   0.028572  
Kakwani and Pernia (2000) index   0.970348    0.272040   0.437160    1.503537  
PEGR  index    0.108590    0.039286   0.031591    0.185590  
g PEGR −     -0.003318   0.030424   -0.062948   0.056311  
 
STD: standard error  
LB: lower bound of 95% confidence interval  
UB: upper bound of 95% confidence interval     36
Results for South Africa 
 
Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
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Table 8: Decomposition of total poverty (headcount) in South Africa, with a poverty 
line of USD 3 























 0.1902    0.0902    0.0172    0.0409    0.2292   0.1001   0.0229    0.0555  
  0.0203     0.0088     0.0021     0.0051     0.0166    0.0029    0.0019     0.0044  
Eastern 
Cape  
 0.6265    0.1587    0.0994    0.2371    0.5267   0.1446   0.0762    0.1843  
  0.0219     0.0118     0.0085     0.0185     0.0133    0.0031    0.0028     0.0064  
Northern 
Cape  
 0.4252    0.0179    0.0076    0.0181    0.4654   0.0240   0.0112    0.0271  
  0.0317     0.0019     0.0010     0.0023     0.0181    0.0007    0.0006     0.0015  
Free State    0.5439    0.0672    0.0366    0.0872    0.3304   0.0624   0.0206    0.0499  
  0.0282     0.0049     0.0027     0.0065     0.0160    0.0018    0.0012     0.0029  
KwaZulu 
Natal  
 0.4290    0.2110    0.0905    0.2159    0.5379   0.2095   0.1127    0.2727  
  0.0248     0.0171     0.0084     0.0193     0.0116    0.0035    0.0031     0.0069  
North West    0.5274    0.0804    0.0424    0.1011    0.4325   0.0696   0.0301    0.0728  
  0.0350     0.0090     0.0057     0.0132     0.0232    0.0027    0.0020     0.0048  
Gauteng    0.1291    0.1700    0.0219    0.0523    0.1934   0.2022   0.0391    0.0946  
  0.0167     0.0171     0.0039     0.0096     0.0125    0.0034    0.0028     0.0063  
Mpumalan
ga  
 0.4907    0.0728    0.0357    0.0852    0.4787   0.0741   0.0355    0.0859  
  0.0298     0.0061     0.0036     0.0084     0.0154    0.0016    0.0014     0.0035  
Limpopo    0.5160    0.1317    0.0680    0.1621    0.5728   0.1134   0.0649    0.1572  
  0.0339     0.0122     0.0086     0.0191     0.0151    0.0025    0.0026     0.0059  
Population    0.4193    1.0000    0.4193    1.0000    0.4133   1.0000   0.4133    1.0000  
  0.0116     0.0000     0.0116     0.0000     0.0053    0.0000    0.0053     0.0000    40
Table 9: Decomposition of total poverty (average poverty gap) in South Africa, with 
a poverty line of USD 3 



























0.0551     0.0902     0.0050     0.0280   0.0756   0.1001    0.0076    0.0460  
0.0070     0.0088     0.0007     0.0042   0.0073    0.0029    0.0008     0.0046  
Eastern 
Cape  
0.2927     0.1587     0.0465     0.2617   0.2088   0.1446    0.0302    0.1836  
0.0137     0.0118     0.0043     0.0216   0.0073    0.0031    0.0014     0.0076  
Northern 
Cape  
0.1693     0.0179     0.0030     0.0171   0.1883   0.0240    0.0045    0.0275  
0.0181     0.0019     0.0004     0.0025   0.0093    0.0007    0.0003     0.0018  
Free State   0.2555     0.0672     0.0172     0.0968   0.1134   0.0624    0.0071    0.0431  
0.0163     0.0049     0.0014     0.0079   0.0070    0.0018    0.0005     0.0031  
KwaZulu 
Natal  
0.1674     0.2110     0.0353     0.1991   0.2344   0.2095    0.0491    0.2986  
0.0136     0.0171     0.0038     0.0204   0.0060    0.0035    0.0015     0.0081  
North West   0.2334     0.0804     0.0188     0.1056   0.1725   0.0696    0.0120    0.0729  
0.0217     0.0090     0.0028     0.0150   0.0097    0.0027    0.0008     0.0046  
Gauteng   0.0395     0.1700     0.0067     0.0378   0.0579   0.2022    0.0117    0.0712  
0.0061     0.0171     0.0013     0.0077   0.0045    0.0034    0.0010     0.0057  
Mpumalang
a  
0.1986     0.0728     0.0145     0.0815   0.2025   0.0741    0.0150    0.0913  
0.0194     0.0061     0.0017     0.0096   0.0087    0.0016    0.0008     0.0046  
Limpopo   0.2325     0.1317     0.0306     0.1725   0.2407   0.1134    0.0273    0.1659  
0.0203     0.0122     0.0043     0.0223   0.0091    0.0025    0.0014     0.0076  
Population   0.1775     1.0000     0.1775     1.0000   0.1645   1.0000    0.1645    1.0000  
0.0064     0.0000     0.0064     0.0000   0.0026    0.0000    0.0026     0.0000  
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Table 10: Decomposition of total poverty (headcount) in South Africa, with a 
poverty line of USD 3 
 























 0.3378    0.7313    0.2470    0.5891    0.3460    0.8121    0.2810    0.6799  
  0.0110     0.0099     0.0078     0.0117     0.0059    0.0040    0.0051     0.0080  
No 
schooling  
 0.6860    0.2349    0.1611    0.3842    0.7039    0.1879    0.1323    0.3201  
  0.0125     0.0090     0.0076     0.0116     0.0104    0.0040    0.0036     0.0080  
Urban    0.2112    0.4818    0.1017    0.2426    0.2630    0.5898    0.1551    0.3754  
  0.0093     0.0184     0.0056     0.0157     0.0072    0.0042    0.0045     0.0086  
Rural    0.6128    0.5182    0.3176    0.7574    0.6293    0.4102    0.2581    0.6246  
  0.0130     0.0184     0.0135     0.0157     0.0070    0.0042    0.0042     0.0086  
Male-
headed  
 0.3608    0.6748    0.2435    0.5806     0.3247    0.5657    0.1837     0.4445  
  0.0111     0.0073     0.0072     0.0102   0.0069    0.0054      0.0044      0.0088 
Female-
headed  
 0.5408    0.3252    0.1759    0.4194     0.5286   0.4343     0.2296     0.5555  
  0.0138     0.0073     0.0071     0.0102    0.0081    0.0054      0.0047      0.0088 
African/Bla
ck  
 0.5168    0.7634    0.3946    0.9409    0.4868    0.7950    0.3871    0.9366  
  0.0118     0.0106     0.0117     0.0044     0.0059    0.0044    0.0052     0.0040  
Coloured    0.2747    0.0856    0.0235    0.0560    0.2843    0.0879    0.0250    0.0605  
  0.0190     0.0052     0.0017     0.0043     0.0164    0.0030    0.0016     0.0039  
Indian/Asia
n  
 0.0268    0.0252    0.0007    0.0016    0.0379    0.0248    0.0009    0.0023  
  0.0063     0.0049     0.0002     0.0006     0.0182    0.0019    0.0005     0.0011  
White    0.0047    0.1259    0.0006    0.0014    0.0031    0.0923    0.0003    0.0007  
  0.0012     0.0067     0.0002     0.0004     0.0014    0.0034    0.0001     0.0003  
Population   0.4193    1.0000    0.4193    1.0000    0.4133    1.0000    0.4133    1.0000  
  0.0116     0.0000     0.0116     0.0000     0.0053    0.0000    0.0053     0.0000  
 
 [-] Standard errors are in italics.   42
Table 11: Decomposition of total poverty (average poverty gap) in South Africa, 
with a poverty line of USD 3 



























0.1353    0.7313    0.0990    0.5576   0.1299   0.8121    0.1055    0.6411  
0.0054     0.0099     0.0039     0.0132   0.0027    0.0040    0.0023     0.0096  
No 
schooling  
0.3150    0.2349    0.0740    0.4168   0.3141   0.1879    0.0590    0.3589  
0.0092     0.0090     0.0041     0.0133   0.0065    0.0040    0.0018     0.0096  
Urban   0.0759    0.4818    0.0366    0.2061   0.0895   0.5898    0.0528    0.3207  
0.0039     0.0184     0.0021     0.0146   0.0030    0.0042    0.0018     0.0093  
Rural   0.2719    0.5182    0.1409    0.7939   0.2724   0.4102    0.1117    0.6793  
0.0086     0.0184     0.0069     0.0146   0.0042    0.0042    0.0022     0.0093  
Male-headed   0.1482    0.6748    0.1000    0.5634   0.1274   0.5657    0.0721    0.4383  
0.0057     0.0073     0.0037     0.0114   0.0032    0.0054    0.0020     0.0099  
Female-
headed  
0.2383    0.3252    0.0775    0.4366   0.2128   0.4343    0.0924    0.5617  
0.0086     0.0073     0.0038     0.0114   0.0042    0.0054    0.0022     0.0099  
African/Blac
k  
0.2221    0.7634    0.1696    0.9553   0.1956   0.7950    0.1555    0.9451  
0.0072     0.0106     0.0064     0.0038   0.0030    0.0044    0.0025     0.0044  
Coloured   0.0886    0.0856    0.0076    0.0427   0.0976   0.0879    0.0086    0.0522  
0.0070     0.0052     0.0006     0.0037   0.0073    0.0030    0.0007     0.0041  
Indian/Asian   0.0056    0.0252    0.0001    0.0008   0.0160   0.0248    0.0004    0.0024  
0.0015     0.0049     0.0000     0.0003   0.0102    0.0019    0.0003     0.0016  
White   0.0017    0.1259    0.0002    0.0012   0.0006   0.0923    0.0001    0.0004  
0.0005     0.0067     0.0001     0.0004   0.0003    0.0034    0.0000     0.0002  
Population  0.1775    1.0000    0.1775    1.0000   0.1645   1.0000    0.1645    1.0000  
0.0064     0.0000     0.0064     0.0000   0.0026    0.0000    0.0026     0.0000  
 
[-] Standard errors are in italics. 
Table 12: Gini indices for South Africa 
 
 1995  2005 
   Group   Estimate     STD    LB  UB  Estimate  STD   LB     UB 
  Population   0.614981   0.006426  0.602364  0.627598   0.6728    0.00464   0.663705   0.681896 
Western Cape   0.555031   0.014723  0.526122  0.583941  0.672204  0.011866   0.648945   0.695463 
Eastern Cape   0.61089   0.014255  0.5829   0.63888   0.632273  0.010149   0.612381   0.652166 
Northern Cape   0.616697   0.017002  0.583312  0.650082  0.60313   0.011478   0.580633   0.625628 
Free State   0.622378   0.013025  0.596802  0.647954  0.632206  0.011968   0.608748   0.655664 
KwaZulu Natal   0.584612   0.01483   0.555493  0.613732  0.657631  0.011163   0.63575   0.679511 
North West   0.602735   0.024562  0.554505  0.650966  0.633894  0.013896   0.606658   0.661131 
Gauteng   0.54103   0.02041   0.500953  0.581107  0.637105  0.009955   0.617591   0.656618 
Mpumalanga   0.545889   0.019193  0.508201  0.583576  0.650575  0.015501   0.620193   0.680957 
Limpopo   0.607209   0.020253  0.567441  0.646977  0.567662  0.012404   0.543349   0.591976 
Urban   0.552995   0.008551  0.536204  0.569785  0.64887   0.005419   0.638248   0.659492 
Rural   0.578594   0.013607  0.551875  0.605314  0.531968  0.007906   0.516471   0.547464 
Some schooling   0.60197   0.00732   0.587597  0.616344  0.663874  0.004823   0.654421   0.673327 
No schooling   0.441819   0.011611  0.41902   0.464619  0.425676  0.013882   0.398465   0.452886 
 
STD: standard error  
LB: lower bound of 95% confidence interval  
UB: upper bound of 95% confidence interval   43
Table 13: Growth-redistribution decomposition of 1995-2005 headcount change in 
South Africa 
 
   Estimate    STD    LB    UB  
   Growth-redistribution decomposition of headcount for total population  
 1995    0.419324    0.011585    0.400241    0.438407  
2005    0.413257    0.005307    0.404527    0.421987  
Growth    -0.09251    0.014906    -0.12173    -0.06329  
Redistribution    0.086443    0.012702    0.061548    0.111337  
 Growth-redistribution decomposition of headcount for Zone Urban
 1995    0.211178    0.009291    0.195874    0.226482  
2005    0.262999    0.007201    0.251154    0.274843  
Growth    -0.065212    0.011513    -0.08778    -0.04265  
Redistribution    0.117032    0.012165    0.093189    0.140876  
 Growth-redistribution decomposition of headcount for Zone Rural
 1995    0.612844    0.012975    0.591471    0.634217  
2005    0.629314    0.007032    0.617747    0.640881  
Growth    0.064195    0.021137    0.022767    0.105622  
Redistribution    -0.047725    0.018246    -0.08349    -0.01196  
   
 
Table 14: Pro-poor indices in South Africa, 1995-2005 
 
   Pro-poor indices    Estimate   STD    LB    UB  
  Growth rate ( g )    0.254    0.052   0.152    0.356  
 Ravallion and Chen (2003) index   0.063    0.026   0.012    0.113  
Ravallion and Chen (2003)  g −     -0.191    0.044   -0.278   -0.104 
 Kakwani and Pernia (2000) index   0.069    0.140   -0.204   0.343  
 PEGR  index    0.018    0.038   -0.056   0.092 
g PEGR −     -0.236    0.038   -0.311   -0.161  
 
STD: standard error  
LB: lower bound of 95% confidence interval  
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